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Trucking Fuel Taxes and
Economic  Efficiency  in
Primary Grain Transportation
James Vercammen
A tax on fuel is one of the primary mechanisms for reducing truck transport exter-
nalities such as greenhouse gas emissions, road damage, congestion, and accidents.
The economic efficiency properties of  a fuel tax are examined for the farm-to-elevator
grain trucking sector-a sector for which the road damage externality is often severe.
Because trucking volumes cumulate more rapidly near the delivery points, marginal
external cost is generally not proportional to distance. Further, noncompetitive FOB
pricing by grain buyers implies that road tax discounts to offset  price markups
should be independent of location. In both cases, a fuel tax is not capable of  efficiently
addressing the externality. With discriminatory pricing by buyers, "cross-hauling"
emerges and the optimal fuel tax is unexpectedly high because the buyer passes on
only a portion of the tax to the farmer. In a simple example with discriminatory
pricing, the optimal fuel tax reduces excess average trucking distance by less than
50%.
Key words: fuel taxes, grain transportation, imperfect competition, spatial model
Introduction
There is a growing literature on truck transport fuel taxes as a mechanism for address-
ing environmental externalities such as emissions (Newberry 1992; Sterner, Dahl, and
Franzen) and more direct externalities such as congestion,  accidents, and road damage
(e.g., Newberry 1988a, b; Vitaliano and Held; Gronau; Jansson; Hau; Verhoef, Nijkamp,
and Rietveld; Calthrop and Proost).
Within this literature, it is well known that a fuel tax is usually less efficient than the
more general optimal road charge, which must continually adjust to make up the differ-
ence between systemwide marginal cost and the portion of average variable cost borne
by the trucker prior to the road charge (Small). More generally, it has been recognized
that fuel taxes paid by truckers can have important distributional impacts and a variety
of secondary impacts within the population as a whole due to income effects and inter-
actions with existing transportation policies and taxation distortions (Gersovitz; Casler
and Rafiqui; Mayeres).
Despite the shortcomings of a fuel tax and despite the fact that technologies now exist
to implement explicit road pricing schemes at a reasonable cost, a fuel tax, in combin-
ation with trucking weight restrictions,  remains the primary mechanism for dealing
with truck transport externalities. At first glance, it would seem a fuel tax is a reasonable
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policy instrument to deal with external trucking costs because fuel consumption and
external costs both tend to be roughly proportional to the volume and distance of
transport.
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the economic efficiency properties of a fuel
tax and to highlight the main disadvantages  of this instrument for controlling truck
transport externalities. The model constructed in this study to examine the fuel tax is
specifically designed for farm-to-elevator grain trucking, but there are many other
scenarios. For example, firms which utilize just-in-time inventory systems where retail
outlets are served by local warehouse hubs (e.g., WalMart) will create externalities and
face fuel tax incentives similar in many respects to those in grain transportation.
Each year over  100 million tons of grain are transported on rural roads, secondary
highways, and freeways in the United States and Canada as grain moves from farms
to primary delivery points. In many cases, road damage from grain transport is consid-
erable, and there is growing concern about other aspects of grain transportation such
as greenhouse gas emissions and accidents.'
What level of fuel tax does a typical grain trucker face? In Canada, a $0.02/liter
federal excise tax on diesel fuel was introduced in 1985, and this tax was later raised to
$0.04/liter (about 7%  of the total price for diesel). In the grain-producing province of
Saskatchewan, the provincial  excise tax for diesel has remained constant at $0.15 per
liter (about 25% of the total selling price) since 1993. Saskatchewan farmers are allowed
to purchase specially marked, tax-exempt diesel fuel for exclusive use on their farms.
However, many farmers are contracting with commercial trucking firms or making
arrangements with grain companies to supply the trucking service, implying a dimin-
ished importance for this tax exemption.
A number of unexpected theoretical results emerge from the current analysis of a fuel
tax, primarily because the grain trucking sector has several unique characteristics. First,
farm-level grain supply is distributed throughout a region and is trucked to one or two
delivery points located within the region. This configuration implies grain volumes
cumulate  more rapidly near delivery points, and thus marginal external road cost is
highest at locations nearest to a delivery point. Because of this spatial variation in mar-
ginal external cost, the optimal road tax is generally not strictly proportional to distance.
The fuel tax is strictly proportional to distance and as a result is not efficient.
A second important characteristic of grain trucking is that the grain procurement
sector is generally noncompetitive as a result of spatially differentiated grain buyers
who market grain with considerable economies of scale. Noncompetitive pricing results
in inefficiently low grain volumes, and thus the efficient fuel tax should be reduced
below the level corresponding to the competitive case. With FOB pricing, this reduction
should be the same for all farmers. A reduction which is independent of location is not
possible with a fuel tax, and consequently the outcome is inefficient. In some situations,
it  will not be feasible for the taxing authority to reduce the fuel tax to completely
Most of Canada's grain is produced in the province  of Saskatchewan. An extensive network of rural roads and highways
connect the approximately 60,000  Saskatchewan farmers with several hundred country elevators (the average distance is
about 30 kilometers).  Many of these roads are thinly paved or graveled, and thus are not designed to handle heavy truck
traffic, especially during the spring thaw. The average cost of road maintenance and upgrading in Saskatchewan is between
16 and 17 cents per ton kilometer for heavy truck traffic (Richards). This expenditure compares with a private truck operating
cost of about 6 cents per ton kilometer. Vercammen estimated total Saskatchewan grain shipments by truck could rise from
about 0.4 billion ton kilometers to as much as 2 billion ton kilometers because of elevator closures.
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eliminate the effects of noncompetitive  pricing because  the tax revenue  is needed to
finance the external costs. The so-called Ramsey pricing solution is formally considered
in the analysis.
Another aspect of the noncompetitive pricing problem concerns the nature of compe-
tition between grain buyers. In the standard environment, buyers are assumed to set
FOB prices (perhaps in a Bertrand fashion) such that farmers who deliver grain receive
the same gross price for their product but pay an amount for trucking (including fuel
taxes) which depends on location. In this case, the farmer's choice of where to deliver is
efficient, but the volume of grain produced is inefficiently low. Rather than setting FOB
prices, buyers may be able to spatially price discriminate. For example, buyers may
compete for grain on a farm-by-farm basis by signing ex ante production contracts.2 In
this case, the price is set at the farm gate and the buyer absorbs the trucking expense.
It  is also established in this analysis that the optimal fuel tax is comparatively high in
the discriminatory  pricing case, and can even exceed the marginal external road cost.
The main reason for this result is that only a portion of the fuel tax is passed on to
farmers when buyers price discriminate.
Discriminatory pricing also results  in "cross-hauling" (i.e., grain from a particular
location moving in multiple directions). A tax on trucking fuel reduces, but does not elim-
inate, cross-hauling. The failure of the fuel tax to eliminate cross-hauling is compounded
by an additional inefficiency: with discriminatory  pricing, grain volumes do not neces-
sarily decrease as the distance to market increases, regardless of the size of the fuel tax.
A simple example demonstrates that the optimal fuel tax reduces excess average travel
distances by less than 50% when buyers price discriminate.  In the long run, when the
location of the elevators is endogenous,  fuel taxes have additional efficiency  consider-
ations. A second example shows a higher tax is generally needed to reduce the spacing
between elevators toward the efficient level.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, the model is developed and the
socially efficient road tax is derived and analyzed under the assumption the FOB pro-
curement price set by a single buyer is exogenous and constant, possibly at a noncompet-
itive level. The next section details the analysis, which focuses on a fuel tax. Specifically,
the optimal fuel tax is derived and its general properties are compared to the optimal
road tax derived in the previous section.  Only in special circumstances are the two tax
mechanisms equivalent.  The case of a fuel tax with discriminatory pricing and cross-
hauling is then considered.  Concluding comments are offered in the final section.
Optimal Road Tax with Fixed
Procurement Price
Consider a straight road of unit length with a grain buyer located at the left end.3
Identical farmers are uniformly distributed  along the road and use a truck to deliver
their grain to the buyer.  The buyer pays a fixed FOB price per unit of grain,  0, for all
deliveries (i.e., there is no spatial price discrimination).  The resale price of each unit of
2 In the absence of production contracts, buyers may choose to set FOB prices but will offer trucking subsidies that differ
according to farm  location.  In the extreme  case,  setting FOB prices and offering trucking  subsidies is  identical  to pure
discriminatory pricing.  Trucking subsidies are common in the province  of Saskatchewan.
3Of course, the assumption the road is of unit length does not result in any loss of  generality because the length of the road
can be implicitly varied by scaling the other parameters of the model.
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grain procured by the buyer is constant atp. The buyer incurs variable cost m per unit
of deliveries and has no fixed costs.4
Let x(r) denote the volume of grain produced by a farmer a distance r to the right of
the buyer, where r e [0,1].  To  simplify the analysis, assume one unit of production is
equal to one truckload of grain (all farmers have the same truck size), such that x units
of production give rise to x truck trips between the farm and the buyer. The conceptual
problem associated with fractional truckloads is ignored. Let c(x) denote the farmer's
cost of producingx units of grain (the same for all farmers). This cost function is assumed
increasing and convex  [i.e., c'(x) > 0 and c"(x) > 0]. Let h(r) denote the per trip trucking
cost for a farmer located at r.5 Specifically, h(r) = ffr  + z(r), where f  is the amount of
fuel used by the truck per unit distance, (  is the unit cost of fuel, and z(r) is a general
function that measures the nonfuel truck costs.6 This latter function is assumed increas-
ing and possibly convex such that z'(r) > 0 and z"(r)  2 0.  The per truckload road tax
imposed by the policy maker for a farmer at location r is given by the general function
t(r).
External Road Cost Function
For each load of grain delivered to the buyer, the road deteriorates and additional exter-
nal costs arise due to factors such as increased congestion, emissions, accidents, stone
chips, and so forth. For simplicity, assume the total external cost at location s depends
only on the cumulative number of truckloads of grain transported over point s. Let X(s)
denote the cumulative  truck volume passing over point s, and let o(X(s)) denote the
external cost function. It  is natural to assume  Y(.)  > 0 and w"(.)  > 0, implying external
costs increase (possibly at an increasing rate) as more trucks pass over point s.
The external cost at point s attributable to the farmer located at r (s < r) can be ex-
pressed as follows:
(1)  o(X(s))  - o(X(s)  - x(r))  ^'(X(s))x(r).
To simplify the analysis, it  is assumed that marginal external cost,  o'(X), is a linear
function  of cumulative volume; that is,  '(X) =  a + [X(r). Given  this assumption,  an
expression for the total external costs attributable to the farmer at point r, denoted Q(r),
can be written as
(2)  Q(r)  = x(r) fr(a + P  lx(t)dt)ds.
This expression can be integrated by parts and rewritten as
(3)  Q(r)  x(r)[ar + P(r rx(s)ds + f  (s)sds].
4 The assumption that fixed costs equal zero is made only for convenience,  and it does not affect the main results of the
analysis.
6 The relationship between trucking cost and location will generally depend on whether the truck is owned and operated
by the farmer or the trucking function is contracted out. This distinction is ignored in this analysis.
6 To account for the return trip, f  should be defined as the amount of fuel used to travel a distance 2r, where the truck is
loaded for distance r and empty for distance r.
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The total external cost from all farmers delivering to the buyer, denoted D, can be speci-
fied as
(4)  D  = fQ(r)  dr.
Substituting in equation (3) and integrating by parts allows equation (4) to be rewritten
as
(5)  D  = a  rx(r) dr + P f  (r)x(r)r dr - 0.5P f  l(r)x(r)r2dr
f  [(r)-  )  (r1)]  x(r)r
2 dr,
where
xo(r) =  r  rx(m)dm  and  xl(r) = - r mx(m)dm.
r  Jo  r 2 Jo
The analysis is greatly simplified if an approximation  is made within equation  (5).
Specifically, substitute the constant x for x0(r) and xl(r), where x can be interpreted as
the average volume delivered by farmers within the system. The approximation is exact
if the farmers' supply schedule  is perfectly inelastic, and diminishes in accuracy the
greater the supply differential between farmers at different locations. After making this
substitution, an expression for approximate total external cost, D, can be rewritten as
(6)  D  = (a + pi)  frx(r)dr - 0.5p3c  fr2x(r) dr.
Incentive Compatibility  Constraint
The problem facing the policy maker is to choose the schedule of road taxes that maxi-
mizes social welfare. The solution procedure entails the policy maker choosing the
welfare-maximizing  level  of output for each farmer along the road. Once the optimal
level of output has been determined, the level of tax required to ensure each farmer will
voluntarily produce the optimal level of output is then determined. The function specify-
ing the correct amount of road tax for a farmer at location r is referred to as the incentive
compatibility constraint.
The incentive compatibility constraint is derived from an individual farmer's first-
order condition for profit maximization. The problem facing a farmer at location r is to
choose x to maximize  profits given by [0  - h(r) - t(r)]x - c(x). The first-order condition
can be written as
(7)  t(r) = 0  -c'(x)  - h(r).
The incentive compatibility constraint given by equation (7) holds globally as well as
locally because c"(x) > 0 and h"(r) 2 0 by assumption.
Objective Function and Solution
It is now necessary to specify the objective function for the policy maker in order to derive
the optimal road tax. The policy  maker sets the road tax to maximize  social welfare,
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denoted S, which is comprised of the sum of producer surplus, tax revenues, and buyer
profits minus the external road cost. The policy maker is assumed to face a budget con-
straint. Specifically, total external costs minus aggregate fuel tax revenues must be less
than Z. The parameter Z represents both the fraction of external costs absorbed by the
taxing authority and the extent of external subsidies to the system.
The objective function can be expressed as
(8)  S  = f  [(0  - h(r) - t(r))x(r) - c(x(r))]dr +  rW  t(r)  dr
+ f1[p-m-0]x(r)dr-D,
s.t.:  D - tt(rxr)  dr < Z.
After canceling and rearranging terms, the Lagrange function associated with equation
(8) can be denoted by
(9)  L  =  {p  - h(r) - m)x(r)  - c(x(r)) + Xt(r)x(r)}dr +  (Z - D).
To derive the optimal level of production for each farmer, it is necessary to first sub-
stitute the incentive compatibility constraint given by equation (7) into equation (9). The
resulting expression does not involve ax(r)/ar or higher order derivatives, and thus dif-
ferentiation with respect to x (i.e., pointwise differentiation) is appropriate to obtain the
set of first-order conditions. After some rearranging, the schedule showing the optimal
level of production at each location r can be represented by
(10)  p - m -h(r) - c'(x)  -D  _  (p - m - 0  + x(r)c"x)) = 0.
ax  1 + X
Equation (10) can be interpreted as follows. The first five terms represent the margin-
al benefits and costs from additional grain production at location r, thus defining the
efficient level of production in the absence of a budget constraint.  The set of terms in
parentheses reflects the extent to which production deviates from the efficient outcome
because of the budget constraint.  For example, ifp - m > 0, implying a positive price
markup by the grain buyer, then a binding budget constraint  (i.e., X > 0) implies pro-
duction at location r is less than the unconstrained  efficient level.
Of primary interest is the form of the optimal tax schedule across the set of farmers.
This schedule is obtained by solving equation (10) for c'(x) and substituting the resulting
expression into the incentive compatibility constraint given by equation (7). After substi-
tuting in the expression for  d01/x obtained from equation (6), the resulting optimal tax
schedule, denoted t*(r), can be expressed as
(11)  t*(r) = (a + pj(1 - 0.5r))r - (p - m - 0 - 3x(r)c"(x))  1
1+x
Equation (11)  shows the optimal tax schedule has two distinct components. The first
component, expressed on a per unit volume and per unit distance basis, is a +  Px(1 - 0.5r).
Notice that all farmers pay a unit tax of a + P3x less a discount which is proportional to
the distance from the chosen delivery point. Only if P = 0 (i.e., the external road cost is
constant) do all farmers pay the same unit tax. Equation (11) emerges because, in the
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absence  of pricing distortions or budget  constraints, the optimal tax for each farmer
equals the sum of the marginal external cost over all points between the farmer and
his/her chosen delivery point. The reason the unit tax rate (i.e., the tax per unit volume
per unit distance) falls for more distant farmers when P > 0 is because the average unit
external cost at a particular point is lower for more distant points due to lower cumu-
lative grain volumes.7
The second component of  the optimal tax schedule in equation (11) corrects for pricing
distortions  and accounts  for the budget  constraint.  Suppose there  is no budget  con-
straint, such that A = 0. If the buyer earns unit revenues in excess of marginal cost equal
to p - m - 0, then it is optimal for the social planner to offset this price distortion with
a road tax reduction  equal to p - m - per unit volume for all farmers.  For farmers
located near the grain buyer, the optimal tax might therefore be negative. If the budget
constraint is binding (i.e., A > 0), then the road tax reduction to account for noncompet-
itive pricing by the grain buyer is smaller. These budget constraint outcomes correspond
to the well-known Ramsey pricing solution in the public economics literature (e.g.,
Atkinson and Stiglitz, pp. 370-75).
Optimal Fuel Tax
Suppose the optimal road tax given by equation (11) cannot be implemented. Further-
more, suppose the only feasible instrument for dealing with the road cost externality is
a fuel tax of y per unit of fuel. With this scenario, the trucking cost function can be
expressed as h(r, y) = f((  + y)r + z(r), and the total per trip fuel tax paid by the farmer
at location r, denoted r(r), can be expressed as r(r) = fyr. To simplify matters, assume
the budget constraint of the taxing authority is not binding (i.e., X = 0), such that the
optimal tax can fully address the noncompetitive pricing externality. It may be the case
that farmers are required to pay a lump-sum tax (e.g., a property tax) to make up any
shortfall in revenue for the taxing authority.
The objective function given by equation (8) can now be rewritten as
(12)  S  = f' [(p - m  - fr  -z(r))x(r)  - c(x(r))] dr - D.
The first-order condition for choosing the value of the fuel tax, y, to maximize equation
(12) can be expressed as
dS  - -m  ~  m  f~r-z)-  (r))-  dx(r)  d;d
(13)  d [(p - m  -fr  -z(r))  - c(x(r))]  d  dr - d  =0.
dy  *  dy  dy
As before, the incentive compatibility restriction can be written as 0  - f(d4  + y)r - z(r) -
c'(x(r)) = 0, and used to show that dx(r)/dy = -fr/c"(x(r)). If these expressions are substi-
tuted into equation (13), then an expression for the optimal unit fuel tax can be specified
as
7 With p = 0, the unit tax is the same for all farmers and is set equal to marginal external cost, a, in which case aggregate
tax revenue just equals aggregate external cost. If P  >  0, then the marginal external cost is increasing as the total volume
of grain increases, in which case the marginal tax rate will exceed the marginal external cost attributable to that farmer.
Now,  aggregate  tax revenue will exceed aggregate  external cost. This type  of result is common in the public  economics
literature (Oum and Tretheway).
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-dD/dy - (p  - m - O)f f  r/c"(x(r)) dr
(14)  Y*= 
o
f 2 f 1 r2/c"(x(r)) dr
Using equation (6), it can be shown that
(15)  d D = -f(a + p)  flr
2/c"(x(r)) dr + 0.5fc f  r/c"(x(r)) dr.
dy  o  o
To further simplify the analysis, consider the special case of a quadratic cost function
where c"(x(r)) is a constant. An expression for the optimal fuel tax paid by the farmer
at location r can be derived by substituting equations  (14) and (15) into the fuel tax
expression,  r(r) = fyr, canceling the c" expressions and then integrating:
(16)  T*(r)  = [a + (5/8)pj  - (3/2)(p - m - 0)]r.
It  is now possible to compare the optimal fuel tax given by equation (16) and the
optimal road tax given by equation (11) for the special case where the taxing authority's
budget constraint does not bind (i.e., X = 0) and the farmers' cost function is quadratic.
The optimal fuel tax is a linear approximation of the optimal road tax, which is non-
linear because of the nonlinear relationship between road volume and external cost. The
parameter p provides a measure of the degree of nonlinearity and is thus central to the
analysis. The multiplier on P for the optimal fuel tax in equation (16) is (5/8)ri, whereas
the multiplier  on P for the optimal road tax in equation  (11)  is (1 - 0.5r)rx (recall r
ranges from 0 to 1). The larger the value of P, the greater the approximation error and
the less  effective  is the fuel tax relative to the first-best outcome. Further, it can be
shown the deadweight loss from using the less efficient taxation scheme increases at an
increasing rate as P takes on larger values.
It  can be shown the two tax functions are equal at r = r*, where r* satisfies
/  \2  '
1 / 2
(17)  r=  -+  - +  - 0.  5  (p-  - -0)  m
8  2pRx  4  p  )  P
If pricing is competitive  (i.e., 0 =p - m), then equation (17) reduces to r* = 3/4 for P > 0.
With O  =p - m and P = 0, the two tax functions are identical, and thus there is no unique
point of intersection.  Equation (17)  also shows that r* is increasing in 0,  implying a
greater degree of noncompetitive pricing results in a smaller value of r*.
The optimal road tax function and optimal fuel tax function are compared in figure 1.
Note, for the competitive pricing case (the top set of graphs), all farmers located between
the delivery point and r = 3/4 prefer the fuel tax to the road tax, while the opposite is true
for farmers  located beyond  r  =  3/4  The intuition  of this result is that the fuel tax is
excessive for distant farmers because the average tax per unit distance is constant but
the average external cost per unit distance declines as distance to the market increases.
As observed from figure  1, the greater the degree of nonlinearity of road damage (as
measured by P), the greater the distortionary and distributional impacts of the fuel tax.
In the noncompetitive  pricing case, the farmer located at r* = r°  < 3/4 is indifferent
between the two tax schemes. Contrary to the previous case, farmers to the left of this
indifferent farmer prefer the optimal road tax to the optimal fuel tax, and farmers to the
right prefer the opposite.
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Figure 1. Comparison of optimal fuel tax and unconstrained
optimal road tax
Finally, it is useful to compare the average optimal road tax and average optimal fuel
tax across all farmers. Integrating equation (11) with X = 0 and equation (16) from 0 to
1, subtracting the latter from the former, and simplifying yields the following:
(18)  f  t*(r)dr - T *(r)  dr = (1/48)p0  - 0.5(p -m  - ).
Equation (18) shows that with competitive pricing (i.e., 0 =p - m), the average optimal
road tax exceeds the average optimal fuel tax, although the difference is relatively small.
Fuel Tax with Strategic Discriminatory Pricing
In the previous section for the case of competitive  pricing, excessive  grain production
was the sole cause of the excessive road cost. In other words, the farmers' equilibrium
choice of where to deliver was efficient, but the amount of grain each farmer produced
was inefficiently high. In reality, external road costs are  often due to both excessive
grain volumes and excessive trucking distances.  Indeed, farmers commonly choose to
deliver to distant delivery points because, as compared to a closer point, they are offered
a better grade or price or are offered a trucking cost subsidy.
In this section, a model is developed wherein "cross-hauling" occurs, and thus trucking
distances are excessive. The basic structure of this cross-hauling model is derived from
chapter 8 of Greenhut, Norman, and Hung, where it is assumed strategic competition
takes an extreme form: perfect spatial price discrimination. With perfect discrimination,
the standard quantity-setting Cournot duopoly result emerges at each farm location.8
8 In a related literature on intra-industry trade with identical products (e.g., Brander; Brander and Krugman; Greenhut,
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Suppose competing grain buyers are located on each end of a line segment of length
L (A on the left and B on the right). As before, distance is measured with respect to the
left side of the line, and thus r denotes the distance between the customer and Buyer A,
and L - r measures the distance between the customer and Buyer B. In reality, the two
firms will generally have different resale prices for the grain they procure. Indeed, ifp
is equal to the port price minus the rail rate from the country elevator position to the
port position, thenp will generally be different for the two firms simply because the two
firms are different distances to the port. Moreover,p may be endogenous to the problem
because the railway's choice of rail rate may depend on the size of the fuel tax. These
considerations are ignored in the analysis (i.e., equalp values are assumed) because the
qualitative  nature of the results  is largely unaffected  by  this assumption,  and  the
modeling becomes significantly more complicated when this assumption is relaxed.
To further simplify the analysis, the following restrictions are imposed:
(a) X = 0 (i.e., there is no budget constraint for the taxing authority);
(b)  c'(x) = a + x (i.e., the supply schedule of each farmer is linear);
(c)  p = 0 (i.e., marginal external road cost is constant); and
(d) z(r) = 0 (i.e., all trucking costs are proportional to fuel use).
The profits for Buyer A when purchasing from a farm located at r can be expressed
as
(19)  7A(r)  = xA(r)[p  - m  - (a +  (xA(r)  +  xB(r)))  - f(d  + y)r].
A similar equation can be written for the profits of Buyer B when purchasing from the
farm located at r. The simultaneous solution to the set of first-order conditions associ-
ated with maximizing the two profit equations yields the following equilibrium quantities
supplied by the farmer located at r:
(20)  x(r) = -[(p-m  -a)  - (3r -L)f((  +y)],
3
xB(r)  =  -[(p  - m-  a) - (2L - 3r)f((k  +  y)].
3
The parameters of the model are assumed to be such that x*(r) and x*(r) both take on
nonnegative values for r e  [0,1].
The two expressions in equation (20) can be added together to obtain total equilibrium
production at location r: x(r) +  xB(r) = 2(p - m - a)/3 -f()  +  y)L/3. Substituting this ex-
pression into the farmer's marginal cost equation, a +  x, results in an expression for the
equilibrium procurement price at location r:
(21)  w* =a+  2-(p-m-a)-  f(  + y)L.
3  3
Equation (21) reveals the size of the equilibrium procurement price is independent of
location. With discriminatory  pricing, the two buyers compete  more aggressively  for
farmers located toward the center of the line segment, and thus the procurement price
does not decrease as the distance to the buyer increases, as in the previous section.9
9 The result that the equilibrium procurement price is the same for all farmers is unique to this simple linear model.
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Equation (21) also shows that only a fraction of the fuel tax is passed on to farmers
in the form of a lower procurement price. Although not formally derived here, it can be
established that if the two competing firms were to set FOB prices in a Betrand fashion
(rather than discriminatory prices using Cournot quantity competition), then more than
100% of the fuel tax is passed on to farmers. In other words, the fuel tax exacerbates
noncompetitive pricing with Betrand pricing, whereas this is not the case with discrim-
inatory pricing.
Substituting equation (20) into equation (19) and integrating over r results in an ex-
pression for aggregate profits for Buyer A. If the resulting expression is multiplied by 2
(because the profits for buyers A and B are identical in equilibrium), then an expression
for aggregate  profits for both buyers can be written as
(22)  A  + B =  -r[(  - m  - a  +f(  + y)L)2
9
-3(p  - m - a +f(d(  + y)L)f(¢  +  y)L + 3f 2(  +  y)2L2].
Similarly, if equations  (20) and (21) are substituted into the farmer's profit equation,
w(r) [xA(r) +  xB(r)]  - a [xA(r) +  xB(r)] - 0.5 [xA(r) +  xB(r)]2, and if the resulting expression is
integrated over r, then an expression for aggregate profit for all farmers, denoted W, can
be represented by
(23)  W  =  1  2(p-m -a)  f(¢ + y)L  ] 2
2  3  3
An expression for the fuel tax on grain from location r delivered to Buyer A can be written
as fyxAr. Making the appropriate substitutions, integrating over r, and multiplying by 2
(because the fuel tax on grain deliveries to Buyer A and Buyer B are identical in equi-
librium) allows an expression for aggregate fuel tax, T;, to be written as
(24)  s=  YL  [p - m - a -f()  +  Y)L].
Similarly, using equation (6) with P = 0, an expression for the equilibrium level of exter-
nal cost can be designated by
(6  D  aL2 (25)  =  (p-m -a-f(4  + y)L).
3
The sum of equations (22) through (24) minus equation (25) provides a measure of net
welfare for the system.  The optimal fuel tax is found by maximizing that expression
with respect to y. The resulting first-order condition can be rearranged and written as
(26)  f*  y*  3aL + 2f(  - (p - m -a) (26)  f  L-2
3L - 2
Properties  of the Optimal Fuel Tax
Equation (26) is an expression for the optimal fuel tax in the discriminatory pricing case.
This expression has several interesting features. First, notice it is possible for the opti-
mal fuel tax to exceed marginal external road cost, a. In the previous section with FOB
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procurement prices, the optimal fuel tax was equal to marginal external road cost minus
an adjustment to account for noncompetitive pricing. Now the optimal fuel tax can ex-
ceed marginal external road cost, despite noncompetitive pricing by the grain buyers.
There are two explanations for this result. First, as previously explained, with discrim-
inatory pricing, the buyers absorb a fraction of any increase to the fuel tax whereas this
is not the case with FOB pricing. A relatively higher fuel tax is therefore needed in the
discriminatory pricing case, and the tax might actually exceed the marginal external
road cost. The second reason why the optimal fuel tax is relatively higher with discrim-
inatory pricing versus FOB pricing is, in the former case, the fuel tax reduces the
average distance an average unit of grain is trucked as well as the volume of grain that
is trucked.
Note from equation (20), dxAld(yf)  = -(r - 1/3), dxBld(yf) = -(2/3 - r), and dxAld(yf)+
dxBld(yf) = -1/3. These results indicate an increase in the fuel tax decreases total pro-
duction at a particular location. More importantly, the decrease in the amount shipped
to the more distant buyer exceeds the decrease in the amount shipped to the less distant
buyer. Only at the center of the line segment are there no distance effects associated
with the fuel tax. Because of reduced cross-hauling, the marginal external benefit of
increasing the fuel tax (and thus the size of the optimal fuel tax) is relatively higher
under discriminatory pricing.
Although the fuel tax raises overall welfare with discriminatory pricing, it is not an
ideal policy instrument. Indeed, a fuel tax reduces but does not eliminate cross-hauling,
and the fuel tax does not eliminate the socially undesirable  result that production is
independent of distance to the buyer. To illustrate the extent to which cross-hauling is
reduced with the optimal fuel tax, it is useful to derive an expression for the average
distance an average unit of grain is trucked (i.e., the volume-weighted average distance
for trucking) and to compare this distance to the analogous expressions in the first-best
case and the no-policy case. Using equation (20), with L set equal to 1 for convenience,
an expression for the systemwide weighted average distance, denoted WAD, can be
written as
(27)  WAD(y)  = 2  f1  rxA(r)  dr=  ( p - m -a)  - f(y  + )
o  xA(r) +  XB(r)  2(p - m - a)  - f(y  + <)
It follows from equation (27) that for the no-tax case,
(28)  WAD(O)  ( - m - a) - f
2(p-  m - a)  - f4
and for the optimal tax case, where  y* = 3a + 2f(  - (p  - m - a),
2/3(p - m -a)  - (a +f4)
(29)  WADW  - =
(p - m -a)  - (a + f))
In the previous  section, the first-best road tax corresponding to the current set of
assumptions is r(r) = ar  - (p -m  - 0). The first-order condition for the farmer at location
r can be expressed as 0 - (a + x) - f(y + a)r + (p  -m  - 0) or, after some rearranging, x*(r)
=p - m - a - (f() + a)r. Integrating over this expression, we find the systemwide volume
of grain production isp - m - a - (fy + a)/4. The weighted average distance for the first-
best case can now be expressed as
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(30)  WADFirstBest 2 f 5 (p  m-a)-(f  +  a)r  dr
(p  - m  - a)  - (f4) + a)/4
(p  - m  -a)  - 1/3(f4  +  a)
4(p - m  -a)  - (f()  + a)
The three WAD expressions given by equations (28) through (30) could be compared
analytically, but a simple numerical comparison is sufficient to illustrate the point that
the optimal fuel tax is only moderately efficient. Supposep = 1, m = 0.1, a = 0.1, f  = 0.5,
and (  = 0.5. With no external road cost (i.e., a = 0), the optimal fuel tax, as implied by
equation (26), is fy* = -0.3. The tax is negative because of noncompetitive pricing by the
two buyers. With a = 0.1, the optimal fuel tax rises to fy* = 0. Here, the benefits of the
tax in terms of reducing the external road cost are just offset by the social cost of the tax
in terms of further aggravating the noncompetitive pricing outcome. With a = 0.16, the
optimal road tax is fy* = 0.18. Now the optimal road tax exceeds the marginal external
road cost, the reason for which was explained above.
With a = 0.16, equations (28) through (30) can be used to establish that WAD(0) =
0.407,  WAD(y*)  = 0.333, and WADFirstBest = 0.238. In other words, with no fuel tax, the
average unit of grain in the system travels a distance of 0.407. With the same parameter
values, a first-best road tax which completely eliminates the noncompetitive pricing and
cross-haul effects results inn average distance of 0.238. With the optimal fuel tax, the
average distance is 0.333. The tax has therefore reduced the average excess trucking
distance by (0.407 - 0.333)/(0.407  - 0.238) = 40%. This simple example illustrates that
the optimal fuel tax is only partly effective at restoring economic efficiency in a discrim-
inatory pricing environment.
Endogenous Elevator Spacing
In the long run, grain buyers make decisions about where to locate elevators as well as
what price to set at each elevator. Decisions about spacing will almost certainly depend
on the level of the fuel tax, and thus it is useful to reexamine the above results in light
of this new variable. While a formal analysis of endogenous spacing is beyond the scope
of the current study, it is possible to present some specialized results. Specifically, the
previous model of discriminatory pricing can be used to determine how the optimal fuel
tax will change if elevator spacing is endogenized. Basic intuition and previous research
suggest that in an unregulated system with no fuel tax, the distance between competing
elevators will be excessive. Consequently,  the optimal fuel tax should be higher than
that determined in the previous section in order to induce grain buyers to locate their
elevators  closer together.  Simulation results from a simple example confirm this out-
come.
The example is constructed as follows. Suppose the grain procurement area consists
of a line of length T and an alternating series of evenly spaced elevators managed by two
competing grain companies (i.e., first A, then B, then A, etc.). All elevators are assumed
identical, and thus the problem reduces to choosing the distance between a represent-
ative pair of competing elevators, once again denoted L. The fixed cost of operating each
elevator  is assumed equal to F.  Fixed costs should depend on L because  of capacity
considerations, but this feature is ignored in order to simplify the analysis. If Tn denotes
the  equilibrium profits  of each  elevator,  then aggregate profits  for one of the  grain
VercammenJournal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
buyers is (n - F)T/L. 10 Similarly, if S is the overall surplus associated with a pair of
competing elevators, then surplus for the entire system is (S - F)T/L. The grain buyers
must choose between reducing competition and conserving on fixed costs by choosing a
relatively large value  of L, or conserving on farm-to-elevator  transportation costs by
choosing a relatively low value of L. The example is further simplified by assuming the
grain buyers choose L cooperatively (i.e., to maximize joint profits) rather than non-
cooperatively.
Equations (22) through (25) have been derived as a function of L, and they can now
be used to calculate total surplus and total grain buyer profits for the system of eleva-
tors, as described above. Assume the taxing authority behaves as a Stackleberg leader
and the grain companies as a Stackleberg follower in the tax-setting game. Specifically,
when faced with a particular level of tax, the grain buyers choose L to maximize joint
profits (the procurement price continues to be set non-cooperatively).  The taxing author-
ity adjusts the level of tax (taking into account the location and pricing response of the
grain buyers) in order to maximize joint surplus for the system.
Suppose p  = 3, m = 0.5, a  = 0, f  = 0.5,  ) = 0.5, a = 0.5, F = 0.2, and T =  100. The level
of tax which maximizes the joint surplus of the system (taking into account the location
and pricing response of the grain companies) is y = 0.51. In this case, the optimal spacing
between elevators is L = 1.152, grain companies earn combined aggregate profits equal
to 96.9, and combined aggregate surplus is equal to 185.94. Now suppose the spacing
between the elevators is held fixed at L = 1.152 (i.e., consider the short-run outcome).
This analysis is now similar to that considered in the previous section with L = 1. In this
case, the level of tax that maximizes joint surplus is y = -0.403  (recall a negative tax may
be optimal to offset the noncompetitive pricing effects). With this revised tax, surplus
for the system rises from 185.94 to 188.43, and combined profits for the two grain buyers
rise from 96.9 to 118.50. Clearly, the optimal tax is much higher when elevator spacing
is considered in the aggregate welfare function.
As illustrated by this simple example, when endogenous spacing is accounted for, there
are additional roles for the fuel tax, and the determination of the optional fuel tax is even
more complex. A high tax is desirable  because it  addresses the road cost externality,
reduces the amount of cross-hauling, and induces competing grain buyers to choose more
efficient spacing between their delivery points. On the other hand, a higher tax further
reduces the equilibrium procurement price and thus exacerbates an existing price distor-
tion. In a dynamic environment where firms first choose location and then choose price,
the determination of the optimal fuel tax would be even more complex.
Discussion
In this study, the efficiency properties of a trucking fuel tax were examined for the case
of farm-to-elevator grain trucking. The main conclusions are as follows. In the absence
of noncompetitive pricing by grain buyers, the optimal road tax is equal to the sum of
the marginal external cost at all points between a farmer and the point of delivery. If
marginal external cost is an increasing function of  volume, then the average tax per unit
distance will decline for more distant farmers because the marginal external cost is
10 For purposes  of this illustration,  ignore the fact that profits for the two  elevators located near each end of the line
segment will generally be different than profits for an interior elevator.
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lower for more distant road segments. Because the fuel tax is proportional to distance,
it generally cannot replicate the optimal road tax. With noncompetitive FOB pricing by
grain buyers, the optimal road tax should be reduced by an amount that is constant
across farmers at different locations. A fuel tax cannot achieve this type of reduction,
and thus once again results in an inefficient outcome.
If buyers  strategically compete and are able to perfectly price discriminate  across
buyers, then cross-hauling emerges as an additional source of inefficiency. A fuel tax is
particularly inefficient with discriminatory pricing because it only partially eliminates
cross-hauling and may not reverse the inefficient outcome that production does not
decline as the distance to market increases. In a simple example, the average excess
travel distance was reduced by less than 50% after the implementation of the optimal
fuel tax. The optimal fuel tax is unexpectedly high with discriminatory pricing because
buyers pass on only a portion of the fuel tax to farmers. If the spacing between elevators
is endogenized, then a higher fuel tax can enhance long-run social welfare by reducing
the spacing toward the efficient level.
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage  associated with the fuel tax (not captured by the
model) is that it is generally not possible to set different tax levels for different indus-
tries. A common tax rate across all transport-based industries will undoubtedly worsen
the efficiency properties of the fuel tax. Because of growing public concern about green-
house gas emissions, taxes on trucking fuel will likely begin to rise in various taxing
jurisdictions  around the world. Given  the extent of noncompetitive  pricing in grain
procurement, it is not clear whether a fuel tax increase will necessarily increase system
welfare in the grain transport sector. Indeed, even in a region such as Saskatchewan,
with an extensive network of truck-sensitive rural roads, it is not clear if increasing the
fuel tax will necessarily increase net welfare. Key to answering this question is deter-
mining the current level of cross-hauling by farmers, the extent to which farmers are
likely to absorb an increase in trucking fuel costs, and the sensitivity of external road
costs to cumulative grain volumes.
An important shortcoming of the current model is that the function W(X(s))  may not
accurately describe external road costs for the case of farm-to-elevator  grain delivery.
In the general transportation literature (e.g., Small), o(X(s)) is often assumed to be a
power function because external costs are primarily in the form of congestion, accidents,
and emissions.  With primary  grain transportation, road damage  is the predominant
external cost, and it is not clear that road damage cumulates with truck volume
according to some smooth and monotonic increasing function. Indeed, road damage
depends on many complex factors such as month of transport (e.g., spring thaw versus
summer), axle and wheel configuration and speed of the truck, and overall road
durability. Roads are generally more durable near major delivery points, and thus in
some cases there may exist an inverse correlation between truck volume and external
road damage.
Similarly, it is important to ask how the optimal fuel tax is likely to depend on the
size of the truck.  This question is difficult to answer because varying the size of the
truck varies the number of truck trips and the overall level of fuel consumption. In some
instances, larger trucks and fewer trips will result in lower overall damage, whereas in
other cases (e.g., a soft road in the springtime) a single trip by a large truck can cause
extensive damage to a road. In most grain-producing regions, truck size is highly heter-
ogeneous, and this heterogeneity will further mask the economic properties of a fuel tax.
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Clearly, more research on the form of the external damage function is needed before a
definitive conclusion about the optimal fuel tax can be reached.
[Received June 2000;  final revision received  August 2001.]
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